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The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't. 
Edited by Vincent Blasi.I New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 1983. Pp. xiv, 326. $25.00. 
Samuel Krislov2 
Collections of essays are not much in favor with publishers 
nowadays. We therefore owe gratitude to Yale University Press 
as well as to Professor Blasi for this unusually good one. One 
might perhaps wish that Professor Blasi had had enough clout 
with the publisher to get the footnotes printed in a convenient 
form or with his collaborators to get them all to address directly 
the subject of the book. One might even wish that every contribu-
tor had composed a chapter of the intellectual quality of Blasi's 
own superb essay. But such hopes are almost always illusory; he 
who edits a multivolume work has given hostages to Murphy (he 
of Murphy's law). This is an uncommon volume, rising above its 
problems with chapters ranging from very good indeed to superb. 
The provenance of the book is mysterious and complex. It is 
"sponsored" by the Society of American Law Teachers and re-
ceived assistance from the Kingsley Trust Association Publication 
Fund. Two essays appeared in expanded form in the Supreme 
Court Review in 1979 and 1982. Material on the justices is re-
printed from the Friedman and Israel collection and photographs 
are from the Court's own collection. There is a foreword by 
Anthony Lewis, not one of his best. 
Thomas Emerson opens the volume with a discussion of press 
law. As would be expected he is profoundly unhappy with the 
Burger Court and suggests that it has persistently undermined first 
amendment rights, leaving the legal posture of the press "some-
what bleak." Similarly, the Dorsen-Gara piece on freedom of 
speech concludes that the Court has sacrificed liberty for property 
rights. Both presentations are single-minded in their advocacy of 
absolute first amendment doctrine, and give no real consideration 
to any misgivings, even those of the Father of Absolutism, Justice 
Black. Their summaries of case law are fair enough as far as they 
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go, but the underlying analysis of social consequences IS one-
sided, pietistic, and not very impressive. 
Rather predictable, too, is Professor Kamisar's treatment of 
criminal law. He evaluates each case meticulously in the light of 
his own strong views, and apparently only the rare decision rates 
even a "C+." Kamisar suggests, however, that the Warren Court 
pulled in its horns in its last years, while the Burger Court has 
recently moderated its pro-prosecution stance. The Court's recent 
endorsement of a "good faith" exception to Mapp may lead Pro-
fessor Kamisar to reconsider the latter conclusion. 
More challenging are the essays on what used to be called the 
"social issues" in the political arena - by Robert Bennett on pov-
erty law, Theodore St. Antoine on labor law, Robert Burt on fam-
ily law, Paul Brest on race, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg on gender 
discrimination. The varying orientations of these pieces give them 
a collective richness not matched by the speech and press essays. 
Brest, Ginsburg, and St. Antoine contributed impressive, non-
tendentious summaries of complex and live areas of law. Bennett 
argues that the Court is excessively influenced by middle-class 
values, and unwilling to face up to the political handicaps of the 
poor. At several points he seems ready to break new ground on 
how the Court might undertake compensatory rulings, but stops 
short each time. 
The Burt essay is reminiscent of Justice Rehnquist's style-
brilliant, suggestive, but strained, perverse, and perhaps even fool-
ish in its fundamental argument. He offers a number of trenchant 
observations on judicial philosophy and the process of decision. 
His basic argument is that the Burger Court sides with bureaucra-
cies, especially in defense of traditional, authoritarian family 
structures. This argument does not do justice to Burger Court 
decisions on women's rights, often in the context of bureaucratic 
and family situations, as well as its decisions on illegitimate chil-
dren. Professor Burt tries heroically to explain away the Yoder 
and Moore v. East Cleveland decisions. Yoder after all exempted 
Amish children from the need to attend school, and East Cleve-
land nullified an attempt to limit the family unit occupying a resi-
dence to parent and children. The emphasis on the historic 
durability of the Amish family structure in Yoder does not com-
port with Burt's generalization. Nor does Professor Burt's sympa-
thy for what he sees in East Cleveland as a middle-class black 
community's desire to build a community based upon "standard 
families" obviate the fact that it is Burt, not the Burger Court, that 
is here pleading for traditional family structure. 
348 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 1:346 
Capping these generally excellent treatments of specific legal 
topics are more general analyses by Blasi and by Martin Shapiro. 
Both are pungent and thought-provoking. Blasi finds the Burger 
Court preoccupied with policy, consequences, but without a vi-
sion-activism without direction. The net effect has been to de-
velop the themes of the Warren court, playing Taney to its 
Marshall. It has been a court of achievements, but not of repute. 
A common perception about the Court of recent years is that it represents one of 
the lower points in Supreme Court history so far as the quality of personnel is 
concerned. That perception is, I believe, quite mistaken. If one concentrates on 
the ideological center of the Court, the three or four or five justices who hold the 
balance of power on the most divisive constitutional issues of the era, the Burger 
Court measures up well compared with its predecessors. Seldom, if ever, in the 
Court's history has there been a period when the pivotal justices were as intelli-
gent, open-minded, and dedicated as Potter Stewart, Byron White, Harry Black-
mun, Lewis Powell, and John Paul Stevens. 
He suggests that the Court's weakness lies in its "ideological 
extremes," in that Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist are 
really centrists in temperament, and consequently not well-
equipped to develop a programmatic constitutionalism. It is hard 
to see Justice Rehnquist, mischievously determined to push the 
Court off the cliff in Gannett and other cases, or so often in solo 
dissent, as an amiable pragmatist. Few would quarrel, however, 
with the characterization of Justice Brennan as a pragmatic liberal 
-perhaps not even the Justice himself. 
In general, Blasi's analysis is more accurate than the conven-
tional one. But I believe that he, like most of us, too readily as-
sumes that a constitutional "leader" has to resemble Brandeis or 
Black. The Court has been led, not merely conciliated, by charis-
matic centrists- by Associate Justice Hughes on commerce cases 
and Chief Justice Hughes on liberties, by Justice Miller, and by 
Marshall himself. Stewart, Powell, White, and Stevens represent, 
as Blasi suggests, a very high level of judicial ability. But the Bur-
ger Court's problem is lack of statesmanship, and that fault is ap-
parent in all wings of the Court. 
Martin Shapiro's article is less developed than most of his 
work, but nonetheless stimulating. It was both generous and logi-
cal for Professor Blasi to let Shapiro's piece close the volume, for 
it raises questions that range well beyond the rest of the book. He 
seems to be gently chiding lawyers (including the authors) for con-
tinuing to believe that proper principles conclusively resolve cases. 
He further suggests that most older constitutional analysts never 
could accept the Warren Court, because it went beyond the New 
Deal consensus, while the new generation of commentators can-
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not forgive the Burger Court for abandoning the pure Warren ap-
proach. His discussion of Ely and Choper and their difficulties in 
rationalizing the dominant role that equality played in Warren 
Court jurisprudence is fresh if not fully realized. There are gestat-
ing ideas here, but the tools of analysis - "New Deal consensus" 
for instance-need further honing before they can cut very deep. 
One topic that still needs treatment is the inhibiting effect of 
the lower courts' attitudes, which on the whole differ considerably 
from those of the justices. A good subject, perhaps, for a Constitu-
tional Commentary article. 
Both in positive terms, and especially in what was not un-
done, the Burger Court emerges redeemed as a court of accom-
plishment, composed of industrious, principled, and intelligent 
jurists. And the Warren Court's achievements and limits emerge 
as well. Its ability to base its sometimes technically weak opinions 
on strong and vital principles has made it difficult to reverse the 
doctrinal advances of that era. 
All in all, the volume is an intellectual treat. If reprinted as a 
paperback, it will make a superior supplementary text for consti-
tutional law courses at both the undergraduate and law school 
levels. 
